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Final draft!

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Evaluate Freud's theory of personality - final draft with references (1550 words)

 
Any discussion of personality runs the risk of becoming as complex as the subject itself. Personality is a continuum including outward behaviour – a public mask – and private thoughts and feelings. To some psychologists, such as trait theorists, personality is a blend of measurable attributes. These attributes (traits) are held to be stable across time and situation. To Freud, however, personality lay beyond that which could be directly observed or measured. He eschewed the term ‘personality’ in favour of the expression ‘character,’ which indicates something more fundamental than the nesting veneers of social acceptability (Monte & Sollod, 2003). Although he apocryphally viewed the healthy character as that which enables the individual to love and work, Freud believed that human beings are motivated by a more primal force, the id, whose power is derived from sexual and aggressive energy. He argued that love and work are fringe benefits which occur when the healthy character is able to sublimate the base energies of the id into the high achievements of mankind, a sublimation which occurs largely beyond consciousness (Freud, 1905).
 
 
This idea that humans are inherently crude sexual and aggressive beings was an unwelcome one when new (Gay, 2006). Freud’s status as a Jew, a cultural outsider (Frosh, 2006), would not have helped dilute the controversy. Thus, it seems that his work, though influential, has always met with opposition, some of it quite emphatic. Issues of palatability may become conflated with the objective assessment of the theory’s validity. Therefore, in carrying out an evaluation of psychoanalytic theory, it is important to untangle the two. For example, contemporary critics have suggested that Freud’s theory is based on socio-cultural artifact and cannot be applied to other times and cultures (Moore, 2004). This of course may be the case. It does, however, seem far-fetched to claim that while people in Freud’s culture may have been deeply irrational, people here and today are certainly nothing like that. Irrational behaviour can certainly be readily observed, even in 21st century Britain, so it can be argued that there remains a need for a psychology of the irrational. In the light of this and of findings from neuroscience which suggest that primary human motivation may indeed be a collection of antediluvian urges (Panksepp, 1998), Freud’s hypothesis remains a candidate.
 
 
The main factor in irrationality is, according to Freud, the existence of a dynamic unconscious. Although unconscious cognition was not a novel idea even in Freud’s time, the notion that the unconscious is an active determinant of conscious behaviour certainly was. The dynamic unconscious, Freud hypothesised, is populated by anxiety-provoking drives, wishes and ideas which have been banished from conscious awareness by psychological defence mechanisms such as repression. Defence mechanisms are the domain of the ego, the portion of personality concerned with mediating between external reality and the – often more pressing – internal reality. They operate to prevent the experience of intense conscious anxiety caused by a conflict between base drives and the moral aspect of the psyche, the superego (Freud, 1923). Things so banished form the hidden bulk of a large psychological iceberg, lurking below awareness, ready to disrupt the smooth voyage of quotidian behaviour. Human beings are therefore, according to Freud, effectively “partitioned systems powered by biological energies” (Monte & Sollod, 2003, p.112), whose best intentions may be derailed by the return of repressed material intruding in a different, encoded form (Freud, 1910).
 
 
Studies by Myers (2000a) lend some weight to this hypothetical mechanism. Her work confirms the idea that repression may be used as an unconscious coping strategy which leads to the avoidance of anxiety. She reports that not only do individuals using repression in this way experience less subjective than objective anxiety (as measured by physiological signs), they also experience poorer physical health than those who do not repress (Myers, 2000b). These findings not only support the idea that repression may be used as a defence, but also that the unconscious is indeed dynamic and that repressed material may exert an influence over other areas of being. Key to her work with repression, Myers conceptualises it as a personality trait rather than a transient state, thereby rendering it observable. This and other empirical studies suggest that what is often considered the biggest flaw in Freud’s theory, its apparent failure to generate hypotheses which are falsifiable by scientific enquiry (Holzman, 1994), is not quite the insurmountable problem it may seem.
 
 
Ironically, the unscientific nature of psychoanalytic theory may have been one of the factors preventing it from toppling into complete obscurity during the shift from ‘talking cures’ to the drug treatment of psychological distress. The scientific method is not concerned with proving hypotheses, and there is still no way of disproving Freud’s theory of personality as a whole. Indeed, the theory clearly suffers from internal inconsistencies and might more accurately be viewed as a collection of sub-theories than as a coherent whole (Fisher & Greenberg 1996). It should be remembered, too, that Freud was a doctor. It can be argued that medical innovation has long been oriented towards problem-solving rather than ‘hard’ science. Until the last two decades, medical practice owed little to the concept of falsifiability, which has lately (with the widespread adoption of evidence based medicine) been adapted from the natural sciences. Freud originally worked within the medical paradigm of his time, not simply viewing repression as a black box but attempting to sketch a neuronal mechanism for it (Borck, 1998). Later, he intentionally rejected even this in favour of a more philosophical approach (Eagle, 1998). Although Freud’s methodology was not expressly scientific, aspects of his theoretical work have been the basis for modern researchers such as Myers to generate viable hypotheses. Given this context, it seems slightly harsh to dismiss his work on purely methodological grounds.
 
 
One area which has not lent itself to scientific investigation is his explanation of the formation of personality. Personality is formed, Freud suggested, during the first six years of life. The maturing child supposedly experiences a number of discrete and biologically-motivated psychosexual phases, during which their essential sexual energies (the libido) become invested in particular areas of the body. So, the id-dominated oral stage, where sensual pleasure is derived via the mouth, gives way to the anal stage and the birth of the ego. This is followed by the phallic stage, during which the Oedipus complex occurs. Famously, during the Oedipal phase, children aspire to be the partner of the opposite-sex parent. Resolution of this complex results in the formation of the superego. Latency follows the phallic phase, which in turn is followed, at puberty, by the attainment of mature genitality (Freud, 1940).
 
 
Freud believed that under certain circumstances, such as excessively strict potty training, fixation of libido could occur. Subsequent development would then be defined by exaggerated characteristics associated with that bodily zone. So, the individual afflicted by anal fixation would theoretically display extreme thrift, stubbornness and a preoccupation with cleanliness (Freud, 1908), all characteristics associated with control. Factor analysis offers some support for the concept of oral and anal personalities (Fisher & Greenberg 1996), the latter being coterminous with Myers’ repressors. The best test of a causal link such as the one between toilet training and anality is the randomised controlled experiment. Ethically, it would be indefensible to carry out an experiment in which participants may emerge with an emotional disability, so it will probably never be possible to apply this test to psychoanalytic theory. However, Baron-Cohen (2006) has proposed an ethical study to examine the causal relationship (as predicted by Freud) between an emotionally unresponsive same-sex parent and a lack of Oedipal resolution in the child. Furthermore, he states that if clinical phenomena identified by Freud are accepted as real, it is the duty of scientists to study them.
 
 
To conclude, this discussion has shown that the psychoanalytic theory of personality is an ambitious and imaginative one, attempting to explain personality’s external manifestations in terms of their deep unconscious origins. Its persistence is all the more impressive given that it was originated without a contemporary understanding of the nervous system or modern technological tools. Freud’s work has always been controversial, which may be due to the sexual emphasis of his hypothesis, his methodology, or the fact that it suggests an unwelcome irrational aspect to every thought and behaviour. It has certainly attracted harsh criticism. However, neuroscience and trait theory have recently been used in the scientific examination of particular aspects of psychoanalytic theory. The level of evidential support obtained has not been definitive, but contrary to received wisdom, portions of Freud’s theory have proved amenable to this kind of appraisal. Findings from several studies are consistent with facets of Freud’s hypothesis, including the notion of a dynamic unconscious, motivation by primitive drives, oral and anal personalities, and repression as a psychological defence mechanism. Methodologies have also been suggested by which other predictions, such as the effects of the failure of Oedipal resolution, may be assessed. So it does seem that, far from being completely irrelevant in the twenty-first century, Freud’s theory still attracts academic interest and may even form the basis for a new understanding of the factors underlying the measurable and observable aspects of personality. Perhaps the volume of useful research spawned may reasonably be one of the criteria by which it is now judged.
 
 
References
 
Baron-Cohen, S. (2006). Empathy. Freudian origins and 21st-century neuroscience. The Psychologist, 19, 536-537.
 
 
Borck, C. (1998). Visualizing nerve cells and psychical mechanisms; the rhetoric of Freud’s illustrations. In G. Guttmann & I. Scholz-Strasser (Eds.), Freud and the neurosciences. From brain research to the Unconscious. Vienna: Austrian Academy of Science Press.
 
 
Eagle, M. N. (1998). Freud’s legacy. Defenses, somatic symptoms and neurophysiology. In G. Guttmann & I. Scholz-Strasser (Eds.), Freud and the neurosciences. From brain research to the Unconscious. Vienna: Austrian Academy of Science Press.
 
 
 
Fisher, S. & Greenberg, R.P. (1996). Freud scientifically reappraised. Testing the theories and therapy. New York: Wiley.
 
 
Freud, S. (1905). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. In J. Strachey (Ed.), The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 12). London: Hogarth.
 
 
Freud, S. (1908). Character and anal erotism. In J. Strachey (Ed.), The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 9). London: Hogarth.
 
 
Freud, S. (1910). The psychoanalytic view of psychogenic disturbance of vision. In J. Strachey (Ed.), The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 12). London: Hogarth.
 
 
Freud, S. (1923). The ego and the id. In J. Strachey (Ed.), The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 19). London: Hogarth.
 
 
Freud, S. (1940). An outline of psychoanalysis. In J. Strachey (Ed.), The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 23). London: Hogarth.
 
 
Frosh, S. (2006). A life on the margins. The Psychologist, 19, 542-543.
 
Gay, P. (2006). Freud. A life for our time. New York: Wiley.
 
 
Holzman, P. S. (1994). Hilgard on psychoanalysis. Psychological science, 5, 190-1. In Davey, G. (Ed.) Complete psychology. Abingdon: Hodder & Stoughton.
 
 
Monte, C. F. & Sollod, R. N. (2003). Beneath the mask – an introduction to theories of personality. New York: Wiley.
 
 
Moore, S. (2004). Personality and intelligence. In Davey, G. (Ed.) Complete psychology. Abingdon: Hodder & Stoughton.
 
 
Myers, L.B. (2000a). Deceiving others or deceiving themselves?   The Psychologist, 13, 400-403.
 
 
Myers, L.B. (2000b). Identifying repressors: a methodological issue for health psychology. Psychology and Health, 15, 205-214.
 
 
Panksepp, J. (1998).   Affective Neuroscience: The foundations of human and animal emotions. Oxford University Press.

 

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